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In United States v. Ammar,1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the personal knowledge foundation re-
quirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 6022 did not apply to cocon-
spirator statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).' The facts of
the case are by no means unusual,4 and it is likely that a conviction
would have resulted whether or not the coconspirator statements at is-
sue had been admitted at trial.5 What is unusual about this case and its
progeny is that they seem to have escaped notice almost entirely-even
by the courts that decided them-despite the fact that this evidentiary
ruling points to serious inconsistencies within the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence that go to the very heart of the federal coconspirator hearsay
.exception.
0
"t A.B. 1983, Bryn Mawr College; M.G.A. 1986, J.D. Candidate 1988, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this piece while a student at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
The Rule states, in relevant part, "A witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of
the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
1 See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 254. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) states: "A
statement is not hearsay if. . . [it] is offered against a party. . . during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy."
" See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 243-45. The case involved the importation of heroin
from Lebanon. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
facts.
5 See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 257 n.16. The court found the coconspirator statements
at issue to be corroborated by other evidence.
' Strictly speaking, the "coconspirator hearsay exception" of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(2)(E) is not an "exception" at all; rather, it is characterized as "not hear-
say" under the Rules. The contrary view holds that admissions, including those im-
puted to a party because they were made by a coconspirator, are exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 508(b) (1947) (treating
agents' and coconspirators' "vicarious admissions" as exceptions to the hearsay rule);
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The Ammar court relied heavily on an Eighth Circuit case, Mah-
landt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc.,' in which the
court stated that the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602 was
not applicable to Rule 801(d)(2)(D), relating to statements made by
agents or servants.8 Mahlandt and Ammar drew their primary support
from a passage in the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(2),
which states:
No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an
admission. The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from
technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustwor-
thiness in some against-interest circumstances, and from the
restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requir-
ing firsthand knowledge, when taken with the apparently
prevalent satisfaction with the results, calls for generous
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.'
While several courts have followed Mahlandt in rejecting a personal
knowledge requirement in the Rule 801(d)(2)(D) agency context,1" few
have followed the Third Circuit's lead in exempting coconspirator
statements from the ambit of Rule 602." Courts have begun only re-
cently to address the issue of reconciling Rule 602 and the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(2), however, and many will almost
certainly have to take a position in the near future. In the criminal
conspiracy context, in particular, the use at trial of coconspirator "ad-
missions" not based on the declarant's personal knowledge is
problematic.'"
With this in mind, two major areas of concern can be identified.
UNIF. R. EvID. 63(9)(a) (requiring that the statement be admissible if made by the
declarant at trial) and 19 (requiring witnesses to have personal knowledge); Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1163 (1954) ("Once it was believed
that admissions were not hearsay. Nobody today would adopt so naive a view." (foot-
note omitted)).
7 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978).
" See id. at 630-31.
1 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
'0 See, e.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 793 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir.
1986); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1143 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1984); In re A.H. Robins Co., 575 F. Supp. 718, 723-25
(D. Kan. 1983). The Third Circuit is also presumably in this group. See Ammar, 714
F.2d at 254. The Second Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue in United States
v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1376 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 82
(1985).
11 See, e.g., United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984)
(adopting without comment the Ammar rule); United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F.
Supp. 658, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
2 See infra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
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The first has to do with the reliability problems inherent in all hearsay,
but which are particularly acute with coconspirator hearsay, 3 and
which are rooted in the rationale behind the coconspirator exception as
it evolved in Anglo-American jurisprudence and was codified in the
Federal Rules.14 A personal knowledge requirement would add a
much-needed guarantee of trustworthiness to coconspirator hearsay that
is admitted as substantive evidence. A second objection to the admission
of coconspirator statements not based on personal knowledge is that the
use of this type of hearsay evidence at trial leads to two anomalies: first,
the admission of an out-of-court statement where the declarant, if pre-
sent at trial, would not be permitted to testify to its content because of a
lack of personal knowledge of the subject matter; second, the admission
of problematic hearsay within hearsay.
This Comment argues that the personal knowledge foundation re-
quirement of Rule 602 should apply to coconspirator statements admis-
sible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Because coconspirator declarations
stand on quite a different footing from other "admissions" vis-a-vis the
hearsay rule, they require greater assurances of trustworthiness. Part I
of this Comment examines the cases that have thus far addressed this
issue. Part II discusses, in turn, the concerns outlined above. Part III
concludes that a personal knowledge requirement for coconspirator
statements and a rejection of the Advisory Committee's unprincipled
codification of the common law view of coconspirator "admissions" are
necessary to ensure the reliability of such evidence.
I. THE CASES
The facts of United States v. Ammar 5 are relatively straightfor-
ward and of a pattern familiar to students of evidence: Ghassan Am-
mar, his wife Judith Ammar, Marshall Stillman, and Roger
McFayden were convicted in federal court on multiple counts involving
a conspiracy to import and distribute heroin from Lebanon. Four co-
conspirators testified against the defendants at trial." On appeal, de-
fendant Marshall Stillman objected to the admission of out-of-court
statements of certain of his coconspirators because those statements
13 Notwithstanding the Federal Rules' classification of coconspirator statements as
"not hearsay," see supra note 6, these out-of-court declarations offered for the truth of
the matter asserted are commonly referred to as "hearsay," as will be the case through-
out this Comment.
14 See infra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
15 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
16 See id. at 243-45.
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were not shown to be based on the declarants' personal knowledge. I"
The Third Circuit did not reject Stillman's contention on the grounds
of harmless error;"8 rather, the court held the statements admissible de-
spite the declarants' lack of personal knowledge, stating:
[I]t is clear from the Advisory Committee Notes that the
drafters intended that the personal knowledge foundation re-
quirement of Rule 602 should apply to hearsay statements
admissible as exceptions under Rules 803 and 804 but not to
admissions (including coconspirator statements) admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2). 9
The court cited as an authority for this assertion Mahlandt v.
Wild Canid Survival & Research Center,.Inc.2 ° Mahlandt involved
an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of defendant Wild Canid Sur-
vival & Research Center, Inc. in a suit arising from an alleged attack
by a tame wolf named Sophie on a boy named Daniel Mahlandt.2" An
employee of the Center, Kenneth Poos, did not see the attack22 but told
his superiors that Sophie had bitten a child. The trial judge refused to
admit this statement under the newly-enacted Federal Rules of Evi-
dence because Mr. Poos had no personal knowledge of the facts.23 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the statement was admissible
against Wild Canid as an agent's statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
and that no personal knowledge requirement was to be read into the
Rule, even though the trial judge "clearly found that the evidence was
not reliable." 4 The court referred to the Advisory Committee's com-
ment calling for "generous treatment" in freeing admissions from the
"technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness."25
The court, then, did not consider reliability to be important in the case
of an admission of a party opponent, even though the statement was
11 See id. at 250, 254, 257. The opinion of the court is unclear concerning which
of the several coconspirator statements involved were allegedly not based on firsthand
knowledge of the declarants.
18 In light of the other evidence in the case, it almost certainly could have done so.
See id. at 257; supra note 5.
11 Ammar, 714 F.2d at 254.
20 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978).
21 See id. at 628-29. For a more detailed account of the facts of this case than is
provided by the Eighth Circuit's opinion, see Bein, Parties' Admissions, Agents' Ad-
missions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 393, 393-401
(1984).
22 There was reason to doubt that Sophie was the attacker. See Mahlandt, 588
F.2d at 629; Bein, supra note 21, at 396-98 & n.25
23 See Mahlandt, 588 F.2d at 629.
24 See id. at 630-31.
25 Id. at 631 (quoting Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(2)).
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that of an agent and not the party itself.
Over the objections of commentators, 26 the post-Mahlandt cases
have followed the Eighth Circuit's rejection of a personal knowledge
requirement in the context of agents' statements. In MCI Communica-
tions Corp. v. AT&T,17 defendant AT&T objected to the admission of
portions of an internal report prepared by its employees on the grounds
that the document was based on hearsay and opinion. The Seventh Cir-
cuit found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting
the report because the employees were agents of AT&T, making the
document an admission by the corporation under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).2 s
Similarly, in Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,29 a
letter written to Chrysler by an employee of Computer Systems of
America (CSA), a company that leased computer equipment to
Chrysler, was found by the First Circuit to be admissible against CSA
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) even though the letter was not based on the
writer's personal knowledge.3" And in In re A.H. Robins Co.,31 which
involved the Dalkon Shield products liability litigation, a federal court
admitted the depositions of six Robins employees as agents' statements
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), noting that "there is . . no need to demon-
strate that the declarant . . . has firsthand knowledge of the facts he is
relating. The continuing employment relationship and the connection
between the statement and the Dalkon Shield project are basically All
that is necessary."' 32 Both Union Mutual and Robins relied heavily on
the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(2).33
Fewer courts have followed the Third Circuit's lead in extending
Mahlandt to coconspirator declarations; in fact only two have done so
thus far. In United States v. McLernon,3 4 a drug conspiracy case, de-
fendants Richard Scott McLernon and Sherri Louise Farrell objected
to the admission of prearrest statements of a coconspirator, Marco
Antonio Valdez-Cota, concerning McLernon and Farrell's involvement
28 See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-216 to -218 (1985) (arguing that the rationale for admitting
party admissions becomes suspect when applied to agents' statements not based on per-
sonal knowledge, and runs contrary to the philosophy of Rules 403 and 805); Bein,
supra note 21, at 451-52 (arguing that Rules 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) should be redrafted
as exceptions to the hearsay rule and, accordingly, that personal knowledge of the de-
clarant should be required to ensure reliability).
27 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1984).
28 See id. at 1143.
29 793 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
11 See id. at 8-9.
11 575 F. Supp. 718 (D. Kan. 1983).
32 Id. at 724.
33 See Union Mutual, 793 F.2d at 8; Robins, 575 F. Supp. at 723-24.
34 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984).
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as couriers for Valdez's cocaine operation." Without comment, the
Sixth Circuit cited Ammar and stated that with regard to coconspira-
tors' statements, "[t]he requirement that the declarant have personal
knowledge of his statements ...is waived."3
In United States v. Badalamenti,37 a district court in New York,
perhaps not unmindful of the Second Circuit's comment that a "recon-
ciliation of Rules 801(d)(2) and 602 should await a case where this is
essential," 8 ruled that "[p]ersonal knowledge of the declarant is not
required where the basis of admissibility is the defendant co-conspira-
tor's authorization (under agency theory) to make the state-
ments-especially where, as here, the statement is within the knowl-
edge of the 'authorizing' defendants. '3' Badalamenti, another drug
conspiracy case, involved a statement made at a Sicilian farmhouse by
one Carlo Castronovo to Salvatore Contorno, a government witness.
40
Carlo told Contorno, allegedly in order to induce him to participate in
narcotics transactions, that Carlo's cousin and coconspirator in
America, defendant Frank ("Ciccio") Castronovo, used pizza parlors as
a front for drug dealing.41 It is unclear, and the court does not explain,
why the fact that this information was within the knowledge of the
defendant Frank Castronovo should argue for its admissibility against
him when he himself neither made nor explicitly authorized the
statement. 2
II. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE ADMISSION OF COCONSPIRATOR
STATEMENTS NOT BASED ON THE DECLARANT'S PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE
A. Reliability and the Evolution of the
Coconspirator Hearsay Exception
At common law, party admissions were admissible against the de-
8 See id. at 1103-04.
SB McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1106.
8 626 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1376 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 82 (1985). Had the Southland court decided whether Rule
801(d)(2) requires that the declarant have firsthand knowledge, it would have consid-
ered Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and agency, rather than Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and coconspiracy.
The issues, however, are nearly identical.
8 Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. at 662.
40 See id. at 662-63.
41 See id. at 662.
42 See id. The court seems to be carrying the agency theory of conspiracy to an
extreme by characterizing what might just as easily have been Carlo's "puffing" about
his American cousin as "authorized" statements.
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clarant regardless of whether the declarant had firsthand knowledge of
the facts,43 was stating an opinion, or was simply relating the opinion
of another." The reason for this rule was said to be that the standard
hearsay objection-lack of opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness-was not here present, because the declarant "certainly . . .can-
not complain of [a] lack of opportunity to cross-examine himself....
[A]s opponent [he] has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand
and explain his former assertion."45 As commentators have observed
over the years, however, this argument loses its force when the declar-
ant is not a party to the litigation, but merely a party's representative.46
The basis for the agency exception is especially weak in the absence of
specific authorization from the party.
47
The coconspirator hearsay exception evolved along slightly differ-
ent lines. It first appeared in its present form in the eighteenth century
English treason trials of those who "taught and advocated" the death of
the King by sympathizing with the French Revolution. 4 The doctrine
that admits a coconspirator's declarations against her fellows developed
'3 See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 263, at 778-79 (3d ed.
1984); 4 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1053, at 16-18 (Chadbourn rev.
1972).
44 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 264, at 779; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note
43, § 1053, at 19-21.
45 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 43, § 1048, at 4-5.
46 See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26; Bein, supra note 21,
at 428 (stating that "the limited rationale that justifies treating both reliable and unre-
liable party admissions identically for purposes of admissibility does not logically ex-
tend to statements made by nonparty declarants." (footnotes omitted)); Falknor, Vicari-
ous Admissions and the Uniform Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 855, 860 (1961) (doctrine
admitting party utterances whether or not based on personal knowledge is difficult to
justify, especially where the admission was made by an employee and not the party
herself); Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 463
& n.4 .(1929) (if vicarious admissions are to be received in evidence, it should be be-
cause the statements are trustworthy, as when they are within the declarant's personal
knowledge, and not because of the existence of a master-servant relationship).
47 The Federal Rules of Evidence nevertheless expanded the law of agency. At
common law, agents' statements were admissible against the principal only if explicitly
authorized by the latter. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26,
801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-218 to -219; see also DeFrancesco v. Western Pa. Water Co.,
329 Pa. Super. 508, 521, 478 A.2d 1295, 1301-02 (1984) (stating that the rule in
Pennsylvania is the "traditional vicarious admission rule requiring proof of agency plus
authority . . ... "). Judge Weinstein has argued that agents' statements should be ad-
mitted if made in the course of employment and if related to the employment, but only
if the statement is based on personal knowledge. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 26, % 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-221 to -227; see also Carswell v. Southeast-
ern Pa. Transp. Auth., 259 Pa. Super. 167, 181-82, 393 A.2d 770, 777 (1978) (opinion
of Spaeth, P.J.) (arguing that unauthorized employee statements should be admitted
only if based on personal knowledge or if some other indicia of reliability is present).
41 See Levie, supra note 6, at 1162; Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Excep-
tion: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 325-26 (1984).
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as an extension of the substantive law of agency.49 In 1827, the United
States Supreme Court formulated the doctrine for American courts in
the leading case of United States v. Gooding:5
[I]n cases of conspiracy and riot, when once the conspiracy
or combination is established, the act of one conspirator, in
the prosecution of the enterprise, is considered the act of all,
and is evidence against all. Each is deemed to consent to, or
command, what is done by any other in furtherance of the
common object.5"
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) is essentially a codification
of the common law rule.52 As the framers of the Rules themselves rec-
ognized, however, "the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fic-
tion.'" That it is difficult to rationalize imputing to a party statements
made by its agent or representative has been noted; that this difficulty
is compounded in the case of a coconspirator's declarations should be
obvious. At least a colorable argument can be made for imputing to an
employer a statement made by an employee while acting within the
scope of her duties. There may, in some cases, be a community of inter-
est between the two-at the very least, the employee may often avoid
making untrue and damaging statements about her employer because
she wishes to retain her job.54
No such argument can be made for the admission of coconspirator
hearsay, however, and it is here that the problem of reliability becomes
particularly acute.55 Unlike the statements of a party, who "can
9 See Levie, supra note 6, at 1163; Mueller, supra note 48, at 331-32; see also
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 267, at 792 n.36 ("If A and B are engaged in a
conspiracy the acts and declarations of B occurring while the conspiracy is actually in
progress and in furtherance of the design are provable against A, because they are acts
for which he is criminally or civilly responsible, as a matter of substantive law.").
50 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827).
51 Id. at 469.
"2 The formulation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra note 3, preserves the tradi-
tional "pendency" and "furtherance" requirements for coconspirator hearsay. The Rule
admits coconspirator declarations made "during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy" as fitting into "the accepted pattern." See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) ad-
visory committee's note. While a charge of conspiracy is not a prerequisite to admissi-
bility, see United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1977); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 267, at 794, the government
is required to prove the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Bourjaily v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4964-65 (U.S. June 23, 1987).
53 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
See Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961);
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE REPORT 165-67 (1963)
[hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT].
" The best argument for applying the agency rationale to the statements of cocon-
[Vol. 135:1265
REASON AND THE RULES
scarcely complain if the court refuses to take seriously his allegation
that his extra-judicial statements are [not] worthy of credence,"5 6 or
who "can hardly be heard to object . . . that he had no opportunity to
cross-examine himself," 57 and unlike an agent, whose interests may in
some cases be aligned with those of her principal, the "hearsay state-
ments of alleged co-conspirators are perhaps the most suspect of all." '58
It has been said that evidence received under Rules 803 and 804 as
exceptions to the rule against hearsay is admissible because it possesses
some guarantee of reliability.59 No assurance of reliability is demanded
of admissions, however. 60 Yet the rationale that justifies admitting the
statements of a party-opponent-that a party cannot complain that she
is not worthy of belief or that she had no opportunity to cross-examine
herself-simply cannot be logically extended to the statements of a non-
party."' There is even less reason to extend this doctrine to the state-
ments of coconspirators, who may have positive incentive to lie in order
to strike a deal or exculpate themselves.62 Certainly, a defendant may
well assert that a coconspirator is unworthy of credence and can right-
fully demand to cross-examine her accuser. The present rule, on the
basis of an ancient and irrational legal fiction,6 3 denies the defendant
this opportunity while dispensing with basic guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, such as the requirement that a hearsay declarant have personal
knowledge of the facts underlying her statement.
Personal knowledge is "[o]ne of the earliest and most pervasive
manifestations" of the common law's "insistence upon the most reliable
spirators may be made in cases of so-called "chain" conspiracy, where the declarant
gave actual instructions to those below (A instructed B, B instructed C, and so on) and
was a central figure in the conspiracy. In the case of "wheel" conspiracy, however,
where there is communication between the "hub" and the coconspirators, or "spokes,"
but not between the "spokes" themselves (A instructed B, A instructed C, and so on),
there is in reality more than one conspiracy. See MODEL PENAL CODE §5.03, at 120
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Indeed, it may be in the interest of the declarant to lie. See
Levie, supra note 6, at 1165.
" Morgan, supra note 46, at 461.
57 Id.
11 NEw JERSEY REPORT, supra note 54, at 167; see also Comment, The Hearsay
Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 530, 541 (1958)
(stating that coconspirators' declarations are unreliable and easy to fabricate).
"' See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 936 (1983); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("The present rule
proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement
may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonpro-
duction of the declarant . . . ."); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 262, at 775; 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 43, §§ 1420, 1422, at 251-54.
60 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 25 & 46 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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sources of information." '64 While reliability is arguably not a concern
where a party herself is the declarant, it is a serious problem in the
context of coconspirator declarations:
Conspirators' declarations are good to prove that some con-
spiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims and
membership. The conspirator's interest is likely to lie in mis-
leading the listener into believing the conspiracy stronger
with more members (and different members) and other aims
than in fact it has. It is no victory for common sense to make
a belief that criminals are notorious for their veracity the
basis for law.
65
Justice Marshall put it differently, though no less eloquently, when he
added: "The unreliability of co-conspirator declarations as trial evi-
dence is not merely a product of the duplicity with which criminals
often conduct their business. It also stems from the ambiguities that so
often appear in all casual conversations, not just those of outlaws."66
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) incorporates pendency and
furtherance requirements, which, by requiring that a statement be
made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy,67 are said to
ensure the reliability of coconspirator hearsay admitted as substantive
evidence.68 These requirements alone, however, cannot guarantee trust-
worthiness. A brief illustration may suffice. Imagine four men involved
in an ongoing conspiracy to rob banks: two, A and B, carry out the
actual holdups; one, C, drives the getaway car; and a fourth, D, awaits
the others at a safe location. At the scene of their latest crime, cocon-
spirator C, in the car, hears gunshots and sees A run from the bank. In
a panic C drives away. He subsequently learns that B and a teller died
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 10, at 23; accord FED. R. EvID. 602 advi-
sory committee's note.
65 Levie, supra note 6, at 1165-66.
"8 United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1131-32 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). It should be noted that personal knowledge of the declarant is one of the "indicia
of reliability" cited in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970), a case that dealt
with the requirements of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Inadi, an-
other confrontation clause case, did not resolve the question of whether the confronta-
tion clause always requires personal knowledge, nor did it deal with what the sixth
amendment requires of coconspirator declarations in terms of reliability. See Inadi, 106
S. Ct. at 1124 n.3 ; id. at 1129 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Recently, the Court has
concluded that "independent indicia of reliability" are indeed not required by the Con-
stitution. See Bourjaily v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4965 (U.S. June 23,
1987). This Comment, however, is concerned only with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the complexities of the confrontation clause are beyond its scope.
17 See supra note 52.
68 See Mueller, supra note 48, at 356.
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in the gunfire. C tells D, in an effort to persuade D that they should
flee the state and ply their nefarious trade elsewhere, "A killed a man."
At A's trial for bank robbery, or perhaps felony murder, D's testimony
as to C's statement would be fully admissible under the Ammar rule
against A as a coconspirator declaration, even though C did not see the
shooting, because the pendency and furtherance requirements are
satisfied.e"
The example can be further complicated. Suppose D is appre-
hended and is about to be tried. The ambitious prosecutor would rather
get a capital murder conviction70 and offers D the opportunity to plead
to a lesser charge in return for his testimony against A. Even assuming
no bad faith on the parts of those involved 7 -both C and D may sin-
cerely believe that it was in fact A who pulled the trigger-the testi-
mony of D as to C's statement, "A killed a man," is admissible under
Ammar against A even though neither C nor D witnessed the shooting.
Because C's statement is admissible as substantive evidence against A
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), it is possible that A might be convicted of a
capital offense on the basis of a statement that was not based on the
declarant's firsthand knowledge of the facts. A is thus put in the
unenviable position of being forced either to take the stand, where to all
appearances he will be attempting to heap the blame onto his dead
friend B, or to rely on cross-examination to undo the prejudicial effect
9 A conspiracy does not end merely because one of the conspirators has been
arrested, see, e.g., Ammar, 714 F.2d at 253 ("[t]he arrest of some of the conspirators,
even its principal member, does not necessarily terminate the conspiracy." (citation
omitted)); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981), especially where, as here, the conspiracy continues to be
viable. Moreover, a conspiracy is presumed to continue until defendants make an af-
firmative showing to the contrary. See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262,
1268-69 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983). C's statement to D is in
furtherance of their joint venture because it is part of a plan to carry on as before in
another jurisdiction. Statements are in furtherance of a conspiracy when made to in-
form a conspirator of its "current status," see, e.g., Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252, to reas-
sure or maintain trust, see, e.g., id., or to make plans, see, e.g., Hamilton, 689 F.2d at
1269. Although these conclusions may of course be disputed, the reader should assume
for the sake of argument that a court could reasonably find the pendency and further-
ance requirements satisfied.
70 The imposition of the death penalty for felony murder, in the absence of major
participation in the underlying felony coupled with reckless indifference to human life,
see Tison v. Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496, 4502 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1987), where the defend-
ant "neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life," is inconsistent
with the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
787-88 (1982). Thus, A could not be sentenced to death if he did not pull the trigger,
unless there were a finding that he acted with reckless indifference.
" There may, of course, be considerable motive for D to lie. See supra notes 65-
66 and accompanying text.
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of C's out-of-court declaration. 72 Requiring that C have personal
knowledge of the facts underlying his statement, "A killed a man,"
would eliminate no trustworthy evidence and would exclude unreliable
and highly damaging testimony by one of A's close associates.
At this point our ambitious prosecutor will claim that in cases of
criminal conspiracy there is a special need for the evidence. This is
often advanced as the "real" reason for admitting coconspirator hear-
say." It is true that a conspiracy is a shadowy beast, not often seen in
the daylight, and its existence is difficult to prove.74 Yet prosecutorial
convenience alone "should not justify departure from the usual order of
proof because once evidence is admitted it can never really be
stricken. ' 7' The admission of unreliable evidence under this rationale
recalls the words of the judges in Sir Walter Raleigh's Case:7" "[I]t
might be a mean to cover many with treasons, and might be prejudicial
to the King."
7 7
B. The Testimonial Anomalies
Perhaps the most curious effect of the doctrine that allows the sub-
stantive use of vicarious admissions not based on the declarant's per-
sonal knowledge is that it leads to two distinct anomalies. First, while
the declarant could not testify to the content of her statement in court
because of her lack of personal knowledge of the subject matter, her
extrajudicial utterance is fully admissible. 78 For example, in Mah-
landt,79 although Mr. Poos' out-of-court statement, "Sophie had bit a
72 It may be that subsequent explanation is an adequate safeguard against the
prejudicial effect of an admission. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 263, at 779
n.14. At best this is a highly controversial view; at worst, it is an "unmitigated fiction."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
11 See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 1 801 (d)(2)(E)[01 1, at 801-
233; Levie, supra note 6, at 1166.
' See Levie, supra note 6, at 1166.
• Id. at 1178.
7 1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 389-520 (1832).
7 Id. at 427.
7 See Falknor, supra note 46, at 860. Falknor illustrates this problem with, oddly
enough, a dog-bite case:
It certainly seems anomalous that where the question is whether the de-
fendant's dog jumped on a woman, defendant's out-of-court statement that
such had occurred (although concededly the defendant was not present at
the time) may be shown (for substantive use) when it is perfectly clear
that the defendant would not be permitted to testify that the dog did not
jump on the woman.
Id. (citing Janus v. Akstin, 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552 (1941)); see also Bein, supra
note 21, at 401 n.58 (doctrine admitting agents' statements not based on personal
knowledge creates an anomaly).
7" Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626
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child that day,"' 0 was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) against his
employer, defendant Wild Canid, l Mr. Poos, because he did not see
the attack, would have been prohibited from actually testifying that So-
phie had attacked Daniel Mahlandt. 2 And in our bank robbery hypo-
thetical, C would not be permitted to testify that A did-or did not, for
that matter-shoot the teller,"2 while his out-of-court statement on that
subject would be admissible under Ammar. 4
It is not difficult to see the illogic inherent in this result. Reason
teaches that a "live" witness is to be preferred to a "hearsay" witness, 5
yet under the Ammar court's interpretation of Rule 801(d)(2), hearsay
testimony is preferred to live testimony when that hearsay is at its most
unreliable. It seems incredible that the drafters of the Rules could have
intended such a result, although it has been said that the value of
coconspirator hearsay, at least, lies in its "independent evidentiary sig-
nificance" as a sort of "snapshot" of a situation that cannot be repli-
cated at trial.8 6 If there is any "independent evidentiary significance" to
coconspirators' statements and other vicarious admissions not based on
personal knowledge, it must relate to the state of mind or belief of the
declarant, and to admit this as substantive evidence against another
makes little sense. The uninformed speculation of a criminal is simply
not reliable proof of objective fact.
The second anomaly created by the admission of coconspirator
hearsay not based on the declarant's personal knowledge may be
termed a "hearsay within hearsay" problem." A coconspirator declara-
tion that is not based on firsthand knowledge must be based upon ei-
ther speculation or gossip.88 In the case of "speculation-based" state-
ments, the danger is from "implicit" hearsay within hearsay. Let us
return to our bank robbery hypothetical to illustrate. If D testifies, as is
permitted under Ammar, to C's statement, "A killed a man," the wit-
(8th Cir. 1978).
80 Id. at 629.
81 See id. at 630.
82 See FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring witnesses to have personal knowledge of the
matters to which they testify).
83 See id.
84 See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 254.
15 See Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126 ("When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay . . . favor the better evidence."
(citation omitted)).
86 See id. at 1126-27.
8V The problem is not confined to coconspirator hearsay, however. All statements
not founded on firsthand knowledge carry with them a certain risk of "smuggled-in"
hearsay.
88 See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, I 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-
216 to -217.
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ness testifies not only to one extrajudicial statement admitted for its
truth,8 9 but to two. The second piece of hearsay is C's opinion, formed
upon seeing A flee the bank in the wake of gunfire. C has in effect read
into A's actions an assertion-or in this case, an admission of guilt.90
C's assumption, based upon facts that were translated by him into an
assertion, and admitted to prove that A killed the teller, is fraught with
the usual hearsay dangers:9 the risks of insincerity and faulty percep-
tion, memory, and narration.9 2
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, of course, this second or
implicit assertion is "not hearsay" because the "declarant," A, is a
coconspirator as well.9" Furthermore, "nothing is an assertion," under
the Rules, "unless intended to be one." 94 The implicit assertion would
thus be as admissible under Ammar as the first, explicit statement, "A
killed a man." Mere technical admissibility, however, cannot overcome
the fact that the reliability problems of coconspirator hearsay in general
are compounded when that hearsay is not based on the declarant's first-
hand knowledge of the underlying facts.
The significance of this "hearsay within hearsay" problem is per-
haps clearer in the case of "gossip-based" hearsay. If an out-of-court
statement is founded on gossip, only the fact that the declarant has been
cryptic about the source of her information may save the statement
89 The Federal Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). If not for the exclusion
provided in Rule 801(d)(2), admissions would of course qualify as hearsay under this
definition.
9 Cf Ammar, 714 F.2d at 250 (coconspirator described an unidentified man as
defendant's "friend," having seen the two together previously, although this characteri-
zation was not based on the coconspirator's personal knowledge).
91 See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-
216 to -217.
92 See FED. R. EVID., art. VIII, advisory committee's note.
See FED. R. EVID. 805 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded
under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.") and 801(d)(2)(E) (excluding cocon-
spirator statements from the definition of hearsay given in Rule 801(c)).
11 FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note. This was not always so. At
common law, an assertion implied from conduct was in fact hearsay, even if the conduct
was not so intended. See Wright v. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 584 (H.L. 1838)
(Vaughan, J.) ("Acts performed by strangers, expressive not merely of opinion, but of
the strongest conviction ... even such acts as these the law will not allow to be
presented to the minds of jurymen as evidence. They are merely opinions expressed in
different language, in the language of conduct, instead of the language of words.
.. .[A]s the opinions of strangers, they bear the general insufficiency and infirmity of
hearsay evidence, without any claim to the privilege which in some peculiar subjects of
inquiry is extended to that class of proof."); see also United States v. Zenni, 492 F.
Supp. 464, 466-67 (E.D. Ky. 1980) ("[The holding of Wright] was the prevailing com-
mon law view.").
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from exclusion under Rule 805 as impermissible hearsay within hear-
say.95 For example, in Mahlandt, the person who found the injured
Daniel Mahlandt with Sophie was Kenneth Poos' seventeen-year-old
son Clarke,96 and it is probable that it was Clarke who told his father
that Sophie bit young Daniel. Had Mr. Poos told his employer, "My
son told me that Sophie had bit a child that day," his statement would
have been inadmissible hearsay within hearsay under Rule 805 for the
simple reason that there is no father-son hearsay exception.9" The re-
sult is that ambiguous utterances receive preferential treatment under
the Rules, and again, it is difficult to believe that the drafters intended
to create such an anomaly.
III. CONCLUSION
A personal knowledge requirement is necessary to ensure the reli-
ability of coconspirator statements admitted under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d)(2)(E). Indeed, one noted authority believes that a per-
sonal knowledge requirement for Rule 801(d)(2) is mandated by the
rationales of Rules 403 and 805."1 This view, however, has thus far
been given short shrift by the courts that have considered it;99 undoubt-
edly most feel constrained by history and the Advisory Committee. 100
For this reason, the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evi-
95 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
9 See Mahlandt, 588 F.2d at 628.
9 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
9s See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-
217 to -218, 1 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-226 to -227, and I 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-
257 to -258.
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence. See FED. R. EvID.
403. Rule 805 allows the admission of hearsay within hearsay if each part of the state-
ment fits into a hearsay exception. See FED. R. EVID. 805; supra notes 87-97 and
accompanying text. As Judge Weinstein notes in his treatise, read literally, Rule 805
will not exclude an admission as hearsay because party admissions are termed "not
hearsay" in Rule 801(d)(2). See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 1
801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-217.
99 See, e.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 793 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1986); Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 630-
31 (8th Cir. 1978). Although it is not altogether clear, the Mahlandt court seems to say
that a statement not based on personal knowledge is opinion testimony rather than
hearsay, so Rule 805, which deals with hearsay, does not apply. This entirely misses
Judge Weinstein's point, namely that the philosophy of Rules 805 and 403 dictates that
unreliable evidence of this type be excluded. This result of course cannot be reached by
a literal reading of Rule 805. See supra note 98. The Union Mutual court, on the
other hand, draws a line between the source of information and the conclusions that
the declarant draws from that information, and seems to say that hearsay dangers are
present only in the first instance. It is difficult to see the logic in this distinction. See
supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
"00 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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dence 801(d)(2) should be redrafted to bring the admissions of cocon-
spirators, which are in'the most serious need of an adequate assurance
of trustworthiness, under the umbrella of Rule 602's personal knowl-
edge requirement. 10 1 Reading such a requirement into Rule
801(d)(2)(E) would not put reliable evidence of criminal conspiracy be-
yond prosecutorial reach and would impose no burden not already
borne by the government for all other evidence in federal court.
'0 One commentator has argued that the federal coconspirator hearsay exception
of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) should be amended to require a showing of trustworthiness for
statements admitted thereunder. See Mueller, supra note 48, at 388-89; cf. Bein, supra
note 21, at 451 (urging that Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) be redrafted as an exception to
the hearsay rule, incorporating an explicit personal knowledge requirement). Even if
the prosecution should not be burdened with the requirement that it make an affirma-
tive showing of trustworthiness, it is difficult to conceive of a persuasive reason to admit
coconspirator hearsay shown to be untrustworthy because it was not based on the de-
clarant's personal knowledge.
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